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Ronald  E.  Dahl ∗,  Jeffrey  M.  Spielberg
University of California, Institute of Human Development, Berkeley, CA 94707, United StatesWe  thank Sarah Helﬁnstein and B.J. Casey for rais-
ing some important issues in their commentary to our
paper  ‘Exciting fear in adolescence: Does pubertal devel-
opment alter threat processing?’ (http://dx.doi.org/10.
1016/j.dcn.2014.01.004, this issue).
In  response, we welcome the opportunity to express
agreement with a few of their key points, to respectfully
disagree on one point, and (hopefully) to clarify some issues
that  we regard as potential misunderstandings.
First of all, we agree that the paradoxes of adolescent
behavior represent a complex and fascinating set of issues
that  will require better integration of several conceptual
and empirical approaches. We  certainly did not mean to
imply  that the goal of our paper was an effort to explain
all  (or even most) of adolescent risk taking with a simple
model, but rather to address one developmental compo-
nent  contributing to this complex picture, focusing on a
hypothesis that may  provide insight into one (affective)
dimension of developmental changes in association with
pubertal  maturation. More speciﬁcally, the goal of our
paper  was not to suggest that [in their words]: “adolescence
[is] one big roller coaster ride of thrills in the face of poten-
tial  danger. . .”; moreover, we do not regard the central
premise of our paper as being that “teens ﬁnd threatening
situations exciting.”
More  generally, we feel strongly that there is value in
moving beyond general statements about “the teen brain”
(and  what we  regard as on over-reliance on results from
cross-sectional studies that often span several of the ‘teen’
years)  and instead focus on studies designed to understand
speciﬁc developmental processes. Accordingly, our study
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youth ages 11 and 12 at time 1) and focused on the role
of  a speciﬁc pubertal hormone—not because we believe
these factors are necessarily the most important aspects
of  risk-taking (or affective changes in adolescence in gen-
eral),  but rather because this approach allowed us to test
speciﬁc  developmental hypotheses.
We hypothesized that puberty is associated with a
maturational shift toward a more complex (and more
ambiguous) processing of threat cues—which may con-
tribute to adolescent tendencies to explore and enjoy some
types  of risky experiences. We  believe that the affective
underpinnings of these changes (associated with a pubertal
increase in sensation-seeking and risk-taking, and possi-
bly  an increased capacity to experience a ‘mixed’ state of
fear/excitement) may  play a role in some adolescent capac-
ities  to learn how to approach some frightening situations
(particularly in some social contexts). However, this seems
a  far cry from implying that all (or most) ‘teens’ ﬁnd all (or
most)  sources of threat to be thrilling.
A second important set of issues raised by Helﬁnstein
and Casey, is the need to move beyond any simplistic
one-to-one mappings of the ventral striatum and amyg-
dala  to positive and negative valence, respectively, and
instead  to recognize the importance of understanding the
distinct  computational roles of these structures in learn-
ing  (Li et al., 2011). We  agree wholeheartedly. There is a
critical  need to better understand how the ventral striatum
and  amygdala work together to inﬂuence adaptive action in
response  to risk/reward tradeoffs during adolescent devel-
opment,  including a focus on the role of maturational
changes in prediction-error processing during adolescence
(e.g., Cohen et al., 2010), and focusing on how these systems
are  involved in reward learning in adolescence.
Broadly speaking the main thrust of the commentary by
Helﬁnstein and Casey is that the pattern of ﬁndings that we
presented  may  be accounted for by theories other than the
ense.
ntal Cog
o
t
t
t
u
d
a
t
(
a
b
a
t
r
m
w
e
i
d
ﬁ
w
v
N
e
t
t
m
r
t
w
r
b
s
aR.E. Dahl, J.M. Spielberg / Developme
ne we offered. We  agree. In fact we would never claim
hat  any set of ﬁndings could be explained by only one
heory. We  welcome alternative models that may explain
hese  ﬁndings and that may  provide better heuristics for
nderstanding these important paradoxes of adolescent
evelopment.
There is however, a second more speciﬁc implication
t the center of Helﬁnstein and Casey’s critique involving
he  particular brain regions that would best serve to test
i.e.,  attempt to falsify) our hypotheses. They suggest that
mygdala and nucleus accumbens (NAc) are poor choices,
ecause these two areas do not respond solely to threat
nd  reward. Respectfully, we argue that the necessary cri-
erion  here is not “which brain region responds only to
eward/threat,” but rather “which brain region responds
ost reliably to reward/threat.”
To  take this a step further, to avoid their critique, we
ould have needed to choose a brain region that responds
xclusively to reward (if such a region even exists). Find-
ng  activation in that region would allow us to say that the
ata  are consistent with our theory. However, a failure to
nd  activation would be relatively uninformative, unless
e  also knew that the reliability of reward-related acti-
ation  in this region was also high. We  chose to examine
Ac, which is known to respond reliably to reward (Bartra
t  al., 2013). Finding activation in NAc, we can say only that
he  data are consistent with our theory. However, a failure
o  ﬁnd activation in NAc would have been relatively infor-
ative,  because the NAc response to reward is relatively
eliable. We  formed our hypotheses based on this line of
hinking  (and the very large number of studies consistent
ith this pattern of reliable, but not necessarily exclusive
esponses).
There is, however, a larger set of issue here, which we
elieve cross back to an area of agreement with Helﬁn-
tein and Casey. We  found greater activation in both
mygdala and NAc in response to threat faces in thosenitive Neuroscience 8 (2014) 98–99 99
youth who  had the largest rise in testosterone (using a
within-subject longitudinal design focusing speciﬁcally on
pubertal  maturation). We  believe this is consistent with
our  interpretation of a more complex processing of threat.
Yet  we  also agree that this raises several unanswered
questions as to how this combination of both amygdala
and ventral striatal responses to threat signals (working
together to perform computational processes regarding
risk and reward) may  contribute to understanding why  this
same  maturational interval (and perhaps this same hor-
monal  mechanism) appears to be associated with increased
sensation-seeking and some tendency to ‘want’ or ‘like’
high-intensity ‘excitement’, and in at least some adoles-
cents, a tendency for thrill-seeking and risk-taking.
More generally, I think we all agree that this is a
very complex scientiﬁc frontier with important clinical
and  public health implications, which deserves a great
deal  of additional study, along with healthy debates and
discussions to move the ﬁeld forward—conceptually and
empirically. We  appreciate the opportunity to try to clar-
ify  our perspective and look forward to learning more from
other  perspectives and approaches. Clearly, this is a rela-
tively  early period in the ﬁelds of developmental cognitive,
affective and social neuroscience, but also a time of rapid
expansion in ways that are beginning to provide exciting
(dare we say, ‘thrilling’?) advances to understanding these
important issues.
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